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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a Decree of Divorce entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on July 3, 1989 by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2A-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding the 
defendant alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month. 
2. Whether the Court abused its discretion in awarding the 
defendant alimony until age 65 in light of the short duration of 
the marriage and the fact that the plaintiff paid to the 
defendant the sum total of $34,500.00 as temporary alimony during 
the two-year period prior to trial. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989). 
30-3-5. Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care 
of parties and children — Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction — Custody and visitation -- Termination 
of alimony — Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In supplement to and correction of Mrs. Rudman's statement 
of the case, Mr. Rudman would submit the following: 
The trial court did award Mrs. Rudman temporary alimony in 
the amount of $1,500.00 per month on September 29, 1987, 
commencing in August 1987. Inasmuch as the order does not 
specify the date on which the alimony was due, the payments were 
due one-half on the 5th and one-half on the 20th of each month 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5 (1989). Although Mrs. 
Rudman did ask the court on three occasions to find Mr. Rudman in 
contempt for his failure to pay alimony, the issue of contempt 
was repeatedly continued until it was ultimately to be heard at 
trial. However, at trial, Mrs. Rudman did not present evidence 
of the contempt, and there was no finding of contempt. 
The first order to show cause was filed by Mrs. Rudman on 
October 15, 1987, only 16 days after the court entered its 
temporary order. (R. 109) By the time Mr. Rudman filed his 
answer on November 2, all sums had been paid. (R. 125) 
Mrs. Rudman!s second motion was dated April 26, 1988, but it 
was filed on May 5, seeking payment for the month of April. (R. 
156-57) The matter was heard on May 9, (R. 161) wherein Mr. 
Rudman was ordered to pay temporary support for April and May by 
May 31, 1988. (R. 187) The issue of contempt was continued 
until further hearing. (R. 18 7) The amounts were paid as 
required, and defendant filed a satisfaction of judgment on June 
15, 1988. (R. 198) 
Mrs. Rudmanfs third motion in re contempt was filed the very 
next day on June 16, 1988 (R. 196), seeking payment for that same 
month of June. The issue of contempt on the third motion was 
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continued a number of times (R. 206-207) and was ultimately 
continued until trial. (R. 212) 
Similar to the motions in re contempt, the motions to compel 
discovery were never heard by the court. 
The remainder of Mrs. Rudman's statement of the case is 
accurate. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Rudman submits the following facts in supplement to or 
correction of Mrs. Rudman's Statement of Facts. 
Mrs. Rudman testified that, prior to the parties1 marriage, 
they had numerous conversations wherein she expressed her concern 
that the alimony she received from her first divorce would 
terminate upon her remarriage. Mr. Rudman denies they ever had 
such discussions and denies that Mrs. Rudman expressed concern 
over her alleged inability to adequately support herself if this 
marriage should fail. (Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 29) Instead, the parties 
discussed and decided that, since they each had their own 
sufficient premarital cash and property, should the marriage fail 
they would each go their own separate ways. (Tr. Vol. 3, pg 30) 
Therefore, the parties entered into a pre-nuptial agreement at 
Mrs. Rudman's suggestion, and it was her attorney who drafted the 
agreement. (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 16) Despite Mrs. Rudman's 
allegations that she entered into the pre-nuptial agreement to 
protect herself from Mr. Rudman's children, Mr. Rudman testified 
that the agreement was designed to allow each of them to maintain 
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as separate the property brought into the marriage. (Tr. Vol. 3, 
pg. 29-30) 
It is true that the pre-nuptial agreement only specifically 
lists one asset, the condominium on Elizabeth Street. (R. 33) 
However, this asset was included in the agreement to provide Mrs. 
Rudman a limited life estate in the event Mr. Rudman died during 
the marriage. (R. 34) 
Prior to execution of the pre-nuptial agreement on April 15, 
1981, Mrs. Rudman was aware that her first husband had filed a 
motion to terminate her alimony in January of that year. Due to 
her upcoming marriage to Mr. Rudman, no final disposition was 
rendered or necessary on this motion. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 115) 
Despite the fact that Mrs. Rudman had no formal education 
or training, she had demonstrated prior to and during the 
marriage the ability to profitably establish and operate small 
businesses. Prior to the marriage, Mrs. Rudman established and 
operated a telephone answering service which she sold for 
$80,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pg 58) In addition, during the 
marriage she purchased and operated a Diet Center and a 
housecleaning business. She paid $38,000.00 for the Diet Center 
in 1983, and in 1988, she sold the Diet Center for $50,000.00. 
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 7-10 and pg. 113) After the parties separated, 
Mrs. Rudman purchased the Merry Maids housecleaning business and 
invested a total sum by her own accounting of $48,186.58. 
(Defendant's Ex. 96) 
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Both the Diet Center and Merry Maids were purchased by Mrs. 
Rudman with her own, personal funds, and the purchases were made 
without the prior knowledge of Mr. Rudman. (Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 
13-14) 
Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she drew no salary from 
either business, and that Merry Maids only showed a nominal 
profit in 1988 and 1989, she also testified on cross-examination, 
that some checks written on the Merry Maids accounts were used to 
pay her personal expenses. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 77-85) Gross sales 
for Merry Maids for March 1987, through September 1988, not 
including the month of July 1987 totalled $194,784.76. (Tr. Vol. 
5, pg. 75) 
Despite Mrs. Rudman's contention that she had to deplete her 
assets because Mr. Rudman did not give her any money during the 
marriage for her personal or household expenses, Mr. Rudman paid 
most household expenses and marital obligations as well as giving 
her money for her personal use. (Tr. Vol 3, pg. 10) Further, in 
the face of Mrs. Rudman's contention that she did not have 
sufficient money to pay expenses after the parties1 separation, 
she chose to expend significant sums of money to purchase and 
remodel a house on Sumac Drive in Logan, Utah. She purchased the 
home for $72,000.00, with a $36,000.00 cash down payment. To the 
date of trial, she had invested approximately $65,000.00 in cash 
for remodeling and repair costs. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 21-22) This 
home in Logan was in addition to the apartment she rented in Salt 
Lake City. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 22) 
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Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she assisted Mr. Rudman 
in the operation of the theater businesses, Mr. Rudman repeatedly 
denied that Mrs. Rudman had any involvement in his businesses 
whatsoever. Specifically, Mr. Rudman testified that Mrs. Rudman 
had never been involved in the operation of Westates (Tr. Vol. 1, 
pg. 50); that she had never contributed any time, labor or 
materials to the Rawlins Theatre (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 53); that she 
did not contribute to the Davis property purchase (Tr. Vol. 2, 
pg. 63); that Mrs. Rudman had never made any contribution of 
money, time, labor or materials to the Logan Theaters (Tr. Vol. 
2, pg. 69); that she had never worked in any of his theaters, 
taking tickets, cleaning or had any other participation (Vol. 2, 
pg. 178); and Mrs. Rudman did not contribute in any way 
whatsoever towards the purchase of the St. George lot. (Tr. Vol. 
3, pg. 179) 
Also contrary to Mrs. Rudman1s assertion that she assisted 
in the construction and furnishing of the Scofield cabin, Mr. 
Rudman testified that this cabin had been substantially completed 
by the fall of 1980, over six months prior to their marriage. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 37) He also testified that he used the cabin in 
1979. (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 34) Duane Slaugh, Mr. Rudmanfs insurance 
agent, testified that the cabin had been completed in 1978 and 
had been insured since that time. (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 155) Other 
witnesses testified as to completing work on the cabin prior to 
the parties' marriage, including but not limited to plumbing, 
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fireplace installation and carpentry. (Trs. Vol, 2, pg. 165; 
Vol. 3, pg. 17; and Vol. 3, pg. 63) 
Although Mrs. Rudman testified at trial that she suffered 
from back problems resulting from being thrown from a horse, no 
medical testimony was offered or introduced at trial; and this 
testimony was disputed by Mr. Rudman. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 224) 
Despite Mrs. Rudmanfs claim that she suffers from certain other 
health problems, there was no evidence that these problems would 
in any way interfere with her ability to conduct her businesses 
and to earn an income. 
The evidence at trial established that Mrs. Rudman had 
monthly living expenses in the amount of $2,853.23 which amount 
included the mortgage payment on the Logan home and the rent 
payment on the Salt Lake City apartment. (Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 102) In addition, although Mrs. Rudman submitted an exhibit 
which indicated that her only source of income was the temporary 
alimony of $1,500.00 per month, the evidence also established 
that deposits into her personal checking account averaged 
$2,858.01 per month. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 113) Mr. Rudman's 
average monthly net income after deductions for federal and state 
income taxes and FICA was $2,184.89. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) 
Mr. Rudman's monthly expenses totalled $3,058.45. (Plaintiff's 
Exhibits Nos. 3 and 38) 
From the time Mr. Rudman was ordered to pay temporary 
alimony of $1,500.00 per month commencing in August of 1987 
through the time of the entry of the decree of divorce in July of 
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1989, Mr. Rudman paid to Mrs. Rudman temporary support in the 
amount of $34,500.00. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 54) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Mrs. 
Rudman alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month until she 
reaches the age of 65 in light of her failure to establish 
financial need and in light of her ability to earn sufficient 
income to meet her own needs. Further, this was a second 
marriage for both parties, and each retained as separate property 
substantial assets brought into the marriage, including income 
producing assets. At the date of trial, Mrs. Rudman had already 
received temporary alimony in the amount of $34,500.00, and the 
Court's order will result in seven years of alimony to Mrs. 
Rudman on a six-year marriage. 
2. In order for Mrs. Rudman to prevail on her argument that 
the trial court abused its discretion in making its determination 
of which assets were marital and the value of those assets, the 
evidence must clearly preponderate against the findings. Because 
the findings at issue are amply supported by the evidence, Mrs. 
Rudman's argument on appeal must fail, and the trial court's 
property division should be affirmed in all respects. 
3. The trial court correctly ordered each party to pay his 
and her own attorney's fees incurred in light of Mrs. Rudman's 
failure to establish financial need and the fact that many of her 
fees incurred were unreasonable because they were incurred as a 
result of her emotional demands to bring unnecessary and 
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frivolous pretrial motions, many of which were never heard by the 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
IN RESPONSE AND ON CROSS APPEAL, THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE AMOUNT AND 
DURATION OF ALIMONY AWARDED 
On appeal, Mrs. Rudman argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion in awarding her insufficient alimony and for an 
insufficient period of time. On cross appeal, Mr. Rudman argues 
that the trial court abused its discretion in that the amount of 
alimony and its duration are excessive. 
The well established factors for a court to consider in 
determining an appropriate award of alimony have been correctly 
set forth by appellant in her brief. These factors include the 
consideration of the financial needs of the receiving spouse, 
that spouse's ability to provide for her own needs, and the 
paying spouse's ability to pay. (See Munns v. Munns,,790 P.2d 
116 (Utah App. 1990)). 
Mrs. Rudman argues that there are insufficient findings of 
fact to indicate that the trial court analyzed these factors in 
making its award of alimony. Instead, the findings are adequate 
in light of the fact that there was sufficient evidence before 
the trial court to make a proper determination of alimony. 
Further, although the trial court did not expressly enumerate all 
of the required factors, the court's consideration of those 
factors is implicit in the findings. Therefore, any lack of a 
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specific finding is not fatal on appeal. As this Court stated in 
Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987): 
This Court concurs in the Supreme Court's 
reflection that more detailed findings on 
each required factor would assist in the 
appellate process. However, we find as did 
the Supreme Court in Paffel, that !the 
evidence in this case supports the lower 
court's order and appellant has made no 
showing to rebut the presumption that the 
trial court did consider respondent's income, 
expenses, and need for support.' 
Id. at 671-72. (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96 at 102 
(Utah 1986)) . 
Applying these principals to the case at bar, there are two 
findings of fact which directly address the issue of alimony. 
The first of these, as Mrs. Rudman points out, is Finding of Fact 
No. 13. In its entirety, it states: 
The Court finds that prior to this marriage, 
the Defendant was receiving $1,100 per month 
as alimony from a prior marriage. The Court 
finds that Defendant [sic] was fearful of 
losing this alimony by remarriage and 
expressed her concern to the Plaintiff and 
the necessity that this marriage be 
permanent. The Court finds that the 
Defendant lost this alimony by virtue of her 
marriage to the Plaintiff and that it is 
reasonable and just that temporary alimony be 
paid to her until she reaches the age of 
Social Security retirement, age 65. 
(R. 380). 
The second finding which addresses the alimony factors is Finding 
of Fact No. 23. Mrs. Rudman failed to address this finding in 
her brief. It states: 
The Court finds that the Defendant was 
employed as an insurance agent and 
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subsequently was self-employed in owning an 
answering service, which she sold in 1976 for 
$80,000.00. The Court finds that during her 
first marriage, she was employed, and that 
during this marriage, she has operated two 
separate businesses and is presently 
self-employed in the third. The Court find 
[sic] that the Defendant resides in Salt Lake 
City, but has purchased a second home in 
Logan, which she visits periodically. The 
Court finds Defendant is a very pleasant and 
dignified-appearing woman, and based upon her 
history, there is no reason why she should 
not continue to work. The Court finds she 
has the means to provide for her own 
reasonable attorney fees and costs in this 
matter. 
(R. 385). 
In addition, Finding of Fact No. 14 deals with the issues 
implicit in the decision to award alimony as it addresses the 
fact that each party helped support themselves during the course 
of this marriage. Finding of Fact No. 14 states as follows: 
The Court finds that both parties contributed 
to living expenses during the marriage, with 
Defendant paying for food and miscellaneous 
household expenses from his funds. The Court 
finds that both parties seemed content to 
share these expenses from their own funds, 
that it appeared Plaintiff paid a greater 
share of said expenses, but that the evidence 
was inconclusive, and the Court finds that 
neither party gained an advantage over the 
other in this regard. 
(R. 380-81). 
There was ample evidence to support these Findings. To 
begin with, despite the fact that Mrs. Rudman had no formal 
education or training, she had demonstrated prior to and during 
the marriage the ability to profitably establish and operate 
small businesses. As outlined in Finding of Fact No. 23, Mrs. 
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Rudman was self-employed in owning an answering service, which 
she had sold for $80,000.00. (R. 385) 
In addition, during the marriage she had purchased and 
operated a Diet Center and a housecleaning business known as 
Merry Maids. She paid $38,000.00 for the Diet Center in 1982, 
and in 1988 she sold it for $50,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 8-9) 
After the parties separated, Mrs. Rudman purchased the Merry 
Maids housecleaning business and invested, by her own accounting, 
a sum of $48,186.58. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 43-44, 52) This business 
was purchased with her own funds (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 74), and 
purchased during a time when she is now claiming she had no money 
for living expenses other than the temporary alimony being paid 
by Mr. Rudman. 
Although Mrs. Rudman testified that she drew no salary from 
either business and that Merry Maids only showed a nominal profit 
in 1988 and 1989, she also testified on cross examination that 
some checks written on the Merry Maids account were used to pay 
her personal expenses. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 77-85) In addition, 
gross sales from Merry Maids from March 1987 through September 
1988, the first year of operation of the business, totalled over 
$194,784.76. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 75) Finding of Fact No. 23 
expressly finds that Mrs. Rudman was self-employed in this 
business, and the evidence is clear that the business is an asset 
from which Mrs. Rudman can meet her own financial needs. (R. 
385) 
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Mrs. Rudman presented evidence at trial that her living 
expenses totalled $2,853.23 (Defendants Exhibit 102), but that 
her only income was temporary alimony in the amount of $1,500.00 
per month. (Defendant's Exhibit 101) Despite this disparity, 
Mrs. Rudman expended significant sums of money during the 
parties' separation to purchase and remodel a house on Sumac 
Drive in Logan, Utah. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 21-22) She purchased the 
home for $72,000.00 with a $36,000.00 cash down payment. To date 
of trial she had invested an additional $65,000.00 in cash for 
remodeling and repair costs. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg 21-22) Further, 
this home in Logan was in addition to the apartment she 
maintained in Salt Lake City, which she testified was her primary 
residence. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 22) In fact, from the time of 
filing of the complaint to the date of trial, Mrs. Rudman spent a 
total of $159,186.58 for the purchase and remodeling of the Sumac 
home, purchase of the Merry Maids business, and the purchase of a 
Jeep. 
Mr. Rudman's average monthly net income after deductions for 
federal and state income taxes and FICA was $2,184.89. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) His monthly expenses totalled $3,058.45. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 38) 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding Mrs. Rudman alimony in the amount of 
$1,100.00 per month. Clearly, Mrs. Rudman has the ability to 
support herself and meet her own financial needs. 
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It was also an abuse of discretion to award Mrs. Rudman 
alimony until she reaches the age of 65. At time of trial, Mrs. 
Rudman was 60 years old. (R. 378) The parties were married on 
April 17, 1981, and the complaint in this matter was filed in 
April of 1987. (R. 2-8) This was, therefore, a six-year 
marriage. From the time Mr. Rudman was ordered to pay temporary 
alimony in the amount of $1,500.00 per month effective August of 
1987, (R. 117-118) to time of entry of the decree of divorce, Mr. 
Rudman paid Mrs. Rudman temporary support in the amount of 
$34,500.00 over a two-year period. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 54) 
From and after entry of the decree in July of 1989, Mr. Rudman 
has been ordered to pay Mrs. Rudman the amount of $1,100.00 a 
month in alimony. (R. 392-396) This results in an additional 
five-years of alimony, for a total of seven years of alimony on a 
six-year marriage. Based on the evidence, these awards were an 
abuse of discretion. 
Although the trial court found that it was equitable and 
just to restore Mrs. Rudman to the position she was in prior to 
her second marriage, that position was questionable at best. Her 
first husband had filed a motion to terminate alimony which was 
pending at the time of her marriage to Mr. Rudman. The marriage 
to Mr. Rudman made the motion to terminate moot, and no 
disposition was made. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 114) 
The Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation in 
the Boyle case, supra. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Boyle were 
married when they were 6 3 and 5 6 years of age respectively. Both 
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had been married before, and their marriage lasted only about 7 
years. In that case, similar to this case, Mrs. Boyle had owned 
a home and had substantial premarital assets. In Boyle, this 
Court upheld the trial court's refusal to award alimony to Mrs. 
Boyle in part because "[s]he had received several months of 
temporary support to give her an opportunity to rehabilitate." 
Id. at 67 2. In this case, Mrs. Rudman received temporary support 
of $34,500 — clearly enough to rehabilitate. 
Based on the evidence then, Mrs. Rudman is not entitled to 
alimony in the amount of $1,100.00 per month until she reaches 
the age of 65. She did not satisfy her burden to establish need, 
and the evidence did establish her ability to provide for 
herself. Inasmuch as Mrs. Rudman is self-employed, there is no 
requirement that she retire at age 65. Given the length of the 
marriage and the duration and amount of temporary support 
awarded, Mrs. Rudman had received ample alimony up to the time of 
trial and no further alimony award should have been entered. 
Instead, the evidence before this Court in the record is 
sufficient for this Court to enter its order immediately 
terminating Mrs. Rudman's alimony. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY 
OR ITS DETERMINATION OF THE VALUE OF THAT 
. PROPERTY 
Mrs. Rudmanfs argument with regard to the characterization 
and value of marital property is merely an argument that her 
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evidence was better than Mr. Rudman's evidence. Instead, the 
trial court considered the evidence of both parties, including 
the expert testimony offered by each, and made a decision based 
upon its evaluation of the evidence and the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
This Court can only reverse findings of fact if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against them. This principal of law was 
outlined in Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). In 
Jensen, the Supreme Court of Utah stated as follows: 
This is a suit in equity. Since appeal may 
be had on the facts as well as the law in 
equity cases, it is our duty, when called 
upon, to weigh the facts as well as review 
the law. 
Although this Court's statements of the 
standard of review of Findings of Fact in 
equity cases have varied considerably, it is 
most commonly said that we reverse only when 
the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings of the trial court. This 
principle is well stated in the plurality 
opinion in Nokes v. Continental Mining and 
Milling Co., 6 Utah 2d at 178-179, 308 P.2d 
954: 
'The finding of the trial court will not be 
disturbed if the evidence preponderates in 
favor of the finding; nor, if the evidence 
thereon is evenly balanced or it -is doubtful 
where the preponderance lies; nor, even if 
its weight is slightly against the finding of 
the trial court, but it will be overturned 
and another finding made only if the evidence 
clearly preponderates against his finding.1 
In substance, this is the same standard 
applied in those cases which state that we 
reverse only when the trial court's finding 
is against the pure weight of evidence. 
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In applying this standard, we are 'mindful of 
the advantaged position of the trial judge 
who sees and hears the witnesses' and 
therefore, 'give due deference to his 
decisions, ' . . . 
Id. at 151-52. (citations omitted). 
To specifically address each of Mrs. Rudman's claims, the 
trial court's decision is supported by extensive and specific 
findings of fact. The first of these is Finding of Fact No. 15, 
wherein the court stated: 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff owned 
considerable properties at the time of the 
marriage to Defendant and that there was no 
co-mingling of Mr. Rudman's assets of [sic] 
those of the Defendant. Plaintiff's assets 
were maintained as a separate entity, 
including those where expansion, remodeling, 
or improvements had been made to that 
premarital property. The Court finds that 
Defendant did not contribute labor or assets 
toward any of these properties and that it is 
reasonable and just that the Plaintiff have 
and maintain his properties, including 
improvements and increases in values thereof. 
(R. 381). 
The court's following Finding, No. 16, enumerated the 
plaintiff's premarital properties. This Finding states as 
follows: 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff [sic] 
premarital properties are as follows: 
a. Condominium at 2560 Elizabeth 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, acquired May 2, 
1980. 
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e. (Plaintiff's one-half interest 
in the Westates partnership, commenced 
approximately 30 years ago, which includes 
rentals of movie screens and/or theaters in 
Soda Springs, Mt. Home, Rupert, Preston, 
Burley, Caldwell and Pocatello, Idaho; Elko 
and Ely, Nevada; movie screens in Davis-
(Layton), known as CinemaCorp, acquired in 
1970, Logan, known as Cache Amusement, Inc., 
including the Redwood, Capital and Cinema I 
theaters; Monticello, Mt. Pleasant, 
Roosevelt, Ephraim, 6 screens in St. George, 
including the Cinema's I, II and III; the 
Gaiety, the Dixie, and the Starlight; Jackson 
and Lyman, Wyoming, and West Yellowstone, 
Montana. 
f. The Plaintiff's one-half 
interest in the St. George condominium 
acquired with James Nicolodemus on November 
13, 1972. 
g. Plaintiff's 80% ownership in 
T.T.&S. Corporation, organized in 1980, which 
included the assets that came from the Rock 
Theater Company, including, Montpelier, 
Evanston, and Rawlins Theater screens, the 
latter of which was sold in 1982. 
h. Plaintiff's interest in the 
Trolley Theaters, Trolley North, Trolley 
Corners, and Trolco, acquired in the 
mid-1960's, and the sale proceeds from 
Plaintiff's Trolley Square interests 
negotiated in 1984, and paid in full in 
January, 1988. 
j. Plaintiff's premarital bank 
accounts, including, but not limited to those 
associated with all of the business entities 
referred to above. 
(R. 381-383). 
The court also specifically addressed the property of the 
parties which was newly acquired and therefore marital property. 
That Finding, No. 19, states: 
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The Court finds that the newly acquired 
property to be considered as marital property 
in this marriage are the lease interest in 
the St. George movie screens Cinema I, II, 
and III, the added screens to the Logan 
Cinemas designated as Cinema II and IIIf the 
triangle piece of land added to the Davis 
Drive-in's; the St. George Bloomington lot 
#17; the Defendant's home at 1515 Sumac Dr., 
Logan, Utah; the Defendant's Merry Maid 
business; the proceeds Defendant received 
from the sale of her Diet Center business and 
miscellaneous property. 
(R. 383). 
Finally the trial court made specific findings as to the 
value of the marital property. Finding of Fact No. 20 states as 
follows: 
20. The Court finds that the marital 
property has the following values and/or 
encumbrances: 
a. Plaintiff's one-half 
leasehold interest in St. 
George Cinemas I, II 
and III $19,000.00 
b. St. George Bloomington 
Lot #17 $22,250.00 
c. Plaintiff's one-half 
interest in the triangle 
land for the Davis 
Drive-in $14,325.00 
d. Cinemas II and III 
(additions to existing 
Cinema I) valued at 
$416,243.00 with con-
struction costs of 
$426,939.00 leaving a 
negative balance of 
-10,696.00. Plaintiff 
has a one- half interest 
therein $-5,348.00 
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-e. 1515 Sumac Dr.f Logan, 
Utah-$107,500.00, 
Defendant's down payment 
of $32,500.00, mortgage 
$40,000.00, remodeling 
costs, $42,000.00-
leaving a negative 
balance $-7,000.00 
f. Defendant's Diet Center, 
initial purchase-$38,000.00 
and sold for $50,000.00, 
Defendant's investment 
of considerable amounts 
therein, with 
a net value of $ 2,000.00 
g. Defendant's Merry Maid 
business with equitable 
value $ 3,500.00 
h. 1500 shares Techno-Lab 
stock $ 0.00 
i. Plaintiff's Jeep 
Wagoneer, value 
$12,000.00, less lien 
of $10,528.39 $ 1,471.61 
j. 50 shares of Prudential 
Financial Service stock $ 587.50 
TOTAL $ 63,134.11 
In Mrs. Rudman's first claimed error, she argues that the 
trial court abused its discretion in its determination of which 
property was marital. The first such item she addresses is loans 
made during the marriage to various business entities. Mrs. 
Rudman seems to argue that, because Mr. Rudman made loans from 
one of his premarital business entities during the course of the 
marriage to another of his premarital business entities, those 
loans somehow became a marital asset. In other words, because 
Mr. Rudman acted as a conduit for these funds, he did so in his 
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personal capacity; and therefore the funds were loaned by Mr. and 
Mrs. Rudman. One does not follow from the other unless and until 
Mrs. Rudman can prove that the funds were co-mingled. Even Mrs. 
Rudman's expert, Merrill Norman, testified that he accepted Mr. 
Rudman's position that the loaned monies came one-half from him 
and one-half from his business partner in Westates, Mr. 
Nicolodemas. On cross-examination by Mr. Rudman's counsel, Mr. 
Norman stated as follows: 
Q. You don't have that readily before you 
whether it was one year ago, five years ago? 
A. It was during the period of the marriage. 
Q. Can you tell me the source of those 
monies as they came to Westates, from whom 
they came? 
A. No. As I testified a few moments ago, I 
accepted Mr. Rudman's answer that half came 
from him and half came from his partner. 
Q. None of it came from Mrs. Rudman, did it? 
A.. Well, when I say Mr. Rudman, I am not 
excluding Mrs. Rudman. I don't know whether 
they came from Mrs. Rudman or not. 
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 191-192). 
Contrary to Mrs. Rudman's assertion in her brief that Mr. 
Rudman presented no evidence as to the source of these funds, Mr. 
Rudman testified extensively as to loans between his various 
business entities. Specifically, Mr. Rudman testified that the 
loans came from cash flow from the other theaters. (Tr. Vol. 3, 
pgs. 81-84) Therefore, Mrs. Rudman is claiming an interest in 
funds which Mr. Rudman exercised control over in the course of 
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conducting and managing his premarital businesses. There is no 
basis for her claim in law or fact, and the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in failing to find that the loans were a 
marital asset. 
As to Mrs. Rudman's claim that the trial court failed to 
adequately value her contributions to the Scofield cabin and the 
Bloomington and Elizabeth Street condominiums, there was ample 
testimony provided by Mr. Rudman contradicting the evidence Mrs. 
Rudman argues on appeal. To begin with, although the total value 
of the Bloomington condominium was listed on Exhibit 117, there 
was no evidence or testimony by Mrs. Rudman as to any 
improvements specifically made by her. 
As to her claim that she made improvements to the Scofield 
cabin, the evidence was overwhelming that the cabin had been 
completed prior to the parties1 marriage. Mr. Rudman testified 
that the cabin had been substantially completed by the fall of 
1980, over six months prior to their marriage. He also testified 
that he had used the cabin in 19 79. Duane Slaugh, Mr. Rudman's 
insurance agent, testified that the cabin had been completed in 
in 1978 and had been insured since that time. Other witnesses 
such as plumbers and other workmen testifed as to completed work 
on the cabin prior to the parties' marriage. (Trs. Vol. 2, pg. 
165; Vol. 3, pg. 17; and Vol. 3, pg. 63) The only improvements 
made by Mrs. Rudman were for purchases of bed linens and drapes. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg. 42-43 and Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 14) Mr. Rudman also 
testified that the cabin was furnished with furniture that he had 
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removed from his Elizabeth Street condominium when Mrs. Rudman 
insisted the parties remodel that condominium to suit her taste. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, pg 43) 
As to Mrs. Rudman's alleged improvements to and furnishing 
of the Elizabeth Street condominium, it was her decision to 
remodel the condominium because she did not like many of its 
features. (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 21-22) Contrary to her assertions, 
Mr. Rudman paid for all of the expenses for that remodeling. 
(Vol. 2, pg. 22) Mrs. Rudman only purchased a coffee table, a 
wall piece and a few other items, all of which she took with her 
when she moved from the condominium. (Tr. Vol. 2, pg. 181-182) 
Again, the trial court was in the best position to judge the 
credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, and the trial court's 
findings are amply supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Likewise, with respect to the value of the Jeep, there was 
quite simply conflicting evidence. Mr. Rudman, the owner of the 
Jeep, who knew its purchase price and optional equipment, 
testified to a figure consistent with the trial court's findings. 
(Tr. Vol. 3, pg. 35-37) Mr. Norman's testimony was not supported 
by any personal inspection of the vehicle or any independent 
knowledge of its mileage and optional features. Once again, the 
trial court analyzed all evidence before it and made its finding 
of fact, which finding is supported by credible evidence. 
Therefore, Mrs. Rudman's claim that the trial court failed 
to properly value the marital estate as to the loans receivable, 
the value of the Jeep and the value of the improvements to real 
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property is simply Mrs. Rudman1s attempt to have this Court 
accept her evidence over the evidence of Mr. Rudman. However, 
that is not this Court's role unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates against the findings. Because each finding was 
amply supported by evidence in the record, there can be no abuse 
of discretion here. Therefore the trial court's findings should 
be affirmed. 
Next, addressing Mrs. Rudman's allegations on appeal with 
regard to the valuations of Cinemas I, II and III in St. George 
and Cinemas II and III in Logan, Mrs. Rudman once again argues 
that this Court should prefer her evidence over that of Mr. 
Rudman. 
Instead, it is clear that the trial court considered all 
evidence presented to it on the issues of the value of the 
cinemas. In its memorandum decision, the trial court stated: 
Both parties called expert witnesses 
(certified public accountants). More often 
than not expert witnesses give testimony 
substantially different from each other. A 
national financial publication recently 
submitted a tax question to 50 CPA's across 
the United States, and received 50 different 
results, with differences in some instances 
exceeding 60%. Experts can differ in theory 
and application. The same experts can look 
at the same facts, and come up with totally 
different conclusions. This is a common 
experience in trial courts. The case at bar 
is no exception. 
The determination to be made by this Court 
will not turn on the intricies of theory or 
application where nearly anything can be 
justified by the same. It is the purpose of 
this Court to do that which is fair, just and 
equitable. It will look to the expert 
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testimony along with all other evidence and 
make its decisions unto that end. 
(R. 352-353). 
This is exactly what the court did, and the findings made by 
the trial court are amply supported by the evidence. 
Mr. Rudman1s expert, Mr. Stephen Nicolatus, used the income 
and asset approaches to determine the value of the leasehold 
interest held by Mr. Rudman and his partner, Mr. Nicolodemus, in 
the St. George cinemas. (Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 12-18) Because the 
fair market value of the equipment which is leased for those 
Cinemas is less than the amount which remains due and owing on 
the lease, Mr. Nicolatus correctly concluded that, using the 
asset approach, the leasehold had no value. 
In applying the income approach, Mr. Nicolatus concluded 
that the leasehold had a value of $76,000.00. (Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 
23) Although Mrs. Rudman's expert, Mr. Norman, challenged Mr. 
Nicolatus1 use of a 25% capitalization rate on the basis that it 
was too high, this opinion was based upon Mr. Norman's 
understanding that Mr. Rudman and his partner enjoyed a monopoly 
in the theater business in St. George. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 140-141) 
However, Mr. Nicolatus testified that his use of that 
capitalization rate was based on several considerations, 
including discussions with John Price of Price Development and 
the St. George Chamber of Commerce. (Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 17) From 
these discussions he learned that ground had been broken on a 
300,000 square foot mall in St. George which will include either 
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a four-screen or six-screen theater. (Tr. Vol. 4, pg. 17) 
Therefore, the basis for Mr. Norman's use of a lower 
capitalization rate was erroneous. 
With regard to Mrs. Rudman's expert's position that the 
figures for officer compensation from the St. George cinemas was 
high, Mr. Norman also testified that the percentage of 
compensation taken from St. George was in line with the 
percentage of revenues generated by St. George. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 
197-198) In other words, the St. George cinemas were assessed a 
pro-rata share of the total officer compensation based upon the 
total revenues generated for all of the theaters in which Mr. 
Rudman had an interest. 
Therefore, considering all evidence before it as to value, 
including conflicting expert testimony, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Rudman's one-half 
interest in the St. George leasehold, using an average of the 
income and asset approaches, was $19,000.00. The evidence 
presented by Mr. Norman at trial and argued by Mrs. Rudman on 
appeal simply does not preponderate against this finding, and it 
should therefore be affirmed. 
As with the St. George cinemas, there was conflicting 
evidence before the court as to the appropriate value of the 
Cache theaters. Mr. Norman's testimony, however, was based on 
his erroneous interpretation of the trial court's ruling on the 
pre-nuptial agreement executed by the parties. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 
183-188) 
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In interpreting the pre-nuptial agreement between the 
parties, the trial court correctly concluded that: 
However, where prior marriage property is 
merely rolled over into another asset, even 
if done so after the marriage, such remains 
the property of the original owner, and only 
that amount in excess thereof constitutes 
property accumulated after the marriage. In 
other words, $10,000.00 in a savings account 
prior to the marriage is not marital 
property, regardless of its increase in value 
during the marriage, but if that $10,000.00 
is utilized to purchase some common stock 
worth $10,000.00, while the value of the 
stock of $10,000.00 is not marital property, 
any increase in the value of that stock would 
be. Any property acquired after the marriage 
is marital, less that amount utilized for its 
acquisition that can be traced to a point 
prior to the marriage. 
(R. 246). 
In her appellate brief at pages 25 and 26, Mrs. Rudman 
accurately points out the testimony of both Mr. Nicolatus and Mr. 
Norman with regards to the value of the Cache theaters. As 
pointed out in the trial court's memorandum decision, experts 
always disagree. However, Mr. Norman's calculations were based 
on Mrs. Rudman's theory that monies accumulated during the course 
of the marriage in Mr. Rudman's pre-marital assets somehow became 
marital monies to be divided at trial. Essentially, Mr. Norman's 
testimony at trial ignored Mr. Rudman's evidence that all monies 
invested in the theaters came from pre-marital assets or 
earnings. Instead, Mr. Norman assumed and Mrs. Rudman argues on 
appeal that there had been extensive co-mingling of those funds. 
(Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 186) That assumption is erroneous and was never 
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proven at trial. Therefore, once again, the evidence does not 
preponderate against the trial court's findings. The finding of 
the value of the Cache theaters was correct and should be upheld 
on appeal. 
Ill 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ORDERING EACH OF THE PARTIES TO PAY HIS OR 
HER OWN FEES 
The decision as to whether or not to award attorney fees and 
costs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. As 
the Utah Court of Appeals stated very recently in Morgan v. 
Morgan, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (June 29, 1990): 
The decision to award fees rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, but must 
be based on evidence of financial need and 
reasonableness. 
Id. at 37. 
Therefore, in order for a party to recover his or her 
attorney fees in a divorce action, that party must establish a 
financial need and the reasonableness of the fees at issue. (See 
also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990); Rasband v. 
Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331 at 1336 (Utah App. 1988); and Asper v. 
Asper, 753 P.2d 978 (Utah App. 1988)). 
Applying this test to the case at bar, the defendant simply 
failed to meet her burden. First, she failed to establish 
financial need. To begin with, she was awarded her business, 
Merry Maids, an income producing asset, which she had purchased 
with her own funds during the parties1 separation. (R. 389) She 
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was also awarded other assets, including the home on Sumac Drive 
which the trial court found had equity of $67,500.00. (R. 389) 
Mrs. Rudman had purchased this home with a cash down payment of 
$32,000.00; and from the time the parties filed their complaint 
for divorce to the time of trial, Mrs. Rudman had invested over 
$65,000.00 in cash into the home for remodeling and improvements. 
Another major expenditure by Mrs. Rudman prior to trial was her 
purchase of a Jeep for in excess of $10,000.00 in cash. (Tr. 
Vol. 5, pg. 69) Notwithstanding making such expenditures while 
at the same time incurring substantial attorney's fees, she 
testified at trial that she did not have the money to pay her 
attorney. (Tr. Vol. 5, pg. 62) A party cannot deplete cash 
reserves for the purpose of purchasing personal assets and then 
expect their spouse to pay their exorbitant attorney's fees. In 
light of all of the evidence, it is clear that Mrs. Rudman did 
not meet her burden of showing financial need. 
Second, the court found that it was not necessary to address 
the reasonableness of the attorney's fees because the court had 
ordered each party to pay their own. (R. 358) The court did, 
however, express concern as to the amount of fees incurred by 
both parties. (R. 358) Although on appeal Mrs. Rudman argues 
that it was an abuse of discretion not to award her attorney's 
fees for the necessity of bringing motions in re contempt and 
motions to compel discovery prior to trial, a review of the 
record establishes the issue of contempt was never addressed. 
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Not having done so, she has waived this issue and is barred from 
arguing it on appeal. 
However, a review of the circumstances surrounding the 
motions in re contempt and motions to compel discovery 
establishes that any fees incurred would have been unreasonable. 
Each of the motions in re contempt were filed only days after 
monies became due and days after documents were filed 
establishing satisfaction of previous amounts due. Of the three 
motions in re contempt and the two motions to compel discovery, 
only one was heard and resulted in an order. That order granted 
Mr. Rudman three weeks to cure a 60-day arrearage, and that 
arrearage was immediately cured. Mr. Rudman submits that these 
motions were filed to harass him and to create a misperception 
before the trial court regarding his performance under the orders 
at issue. As a result, Mrs. Rudman is not entitled to fees for 
those motions. 
Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion to order each 
party to pay their own attorney's fees, and the trial court's 
order should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact with respect to the 
characterization of marital property and its determination of the 
value of that property were amply supported by the evidence. The 
division of that property therefore should be affirmed. Further, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering each of 
the parties to pay their own attorney's fee. The trial court's 
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award of alimony, however, was excessive. Based upon the 
evidence in the record and the findings of fact, this Court 
should immediately terminate Mrs. Rudman's alimony. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ r a day of July, 1990. 
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